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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
OF CASH FLOW AND
INVESTMENT FLUCTUATIONS
USING FIRM-LEVEL PANEL DATA*
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Nur Azura Sanusi
Since the pioneering work of Gurley and Shaw (1955), the
attempt has been done to justify money as a primary focal point of
macroeconomic theorizing. However, other researchers argue that
variables such as financial development and indicators are also
important to be linked with macroeconomic performance. Here, if
money can be thought as means of production and consumer goods
as the ultimate end toward which production is directed, and then
capital also occupies a position that is both logically and tempo-
rarily intermediate between original means and ultimate ends. This
temporarily intermediate status of capital is not in serious dispute,
but its significance for macroeconomic theorizing is rarely recog-
nized. The firms’ decision to acquire funds through debt and equity
financings affects the capital structure, and, in the firm’s balance
sheet, the impact of capital appears to influence the inventory
investment. Hence, the significance of capital structure –induced
inventory distortions in the context of firm-level is the basis for our
article. The sample for our analysis is compiled from the balance
sheets of listed syaria firms in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange for
the period 1995-2000.
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 6th Malaysia Finance Association
Symposium held in Langkawi on the 5-6th May 2004. We would like to thanks Ghon Rhee,
Moureonen and Noor Azlan Ghazali for their valuable comments.
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Introduction
Most of macroeconomic theory is
based on the idea of perfect capital
markets, that is, smooth functioning of
financial systems that justifies abstrac-
tion from financial considerations.
Beginning with the seminal work of
Modigliani and Miller (1958), the idea
that financial structure was indetermi-
nate and irrelevant for investment de-
cisions has heavily influenced modern
theory. The major developments in
investment research in the 1960’s, the
neoclassical and q models,1  made use
of Modigliani-Miller proposition of
isolation between real firm decisions
and financial factors.
However, empirical work has tra-
ditionally produced results inconsis-
tent with the notion of “financial irrel-
evance.” In particular, evidence has
been found on: (a) the role of break-
downs in financial trade in historically
important economic contractions, (b)
the role of movements in internal fi-
nance in predicting investment, (c)
persistent differences in the way cer-
tain types of firms raise finance, and
(d) the regular cyclical movements of
financial variables (e.g., balance sheet
positions, liquidity ratios, and bank
credit).
In order to reconcile theory and
empirical studies in finance and in-
vestment, recent research has made
use of models in which informational
asymmetries between “borrowers” and
“lenders” introduce incentive prob-
lems in financial relationships, creat-
ing informational frictions and making
financing and investment decisions in-
terdependent in specific ways. Then
Blanchard and Fischer (1989) point
out that the work attempting to account
for certain features of the financial
markets from the viewpoint of asym-
metric information is extremely im-
portant and that it will be increasingly
integrated in complete macroeconomic
models.
Later, much of this research has
proceeded in two agendas, modeling:
(a) the role of asymmetric information
in linking movements between finance
and investment, holding constant un-
derlying opportunities, and (b) the
importance of information problems
in accounting for observed differences
in financing patterns and mechanisms
for corporate control.
Based on this background, the
motivation of this paper is to produce
the empirical evidence of investment
that is expected to be more sensitive to
current cash flow than a frictionless
neoclassical model would predict, with
results stronger for fixed effects. The
rest of the paper is organized in the
following way: the next section ex-
plains the theoretical background; the
model used, data sources and estima-
tion procedure are outlined in the third
section; empirical results are exam-
ined in the fourth section; and the fifth
section summarizes the conclusions.
1 For the neoclassical model, see Hall and Jorgenson (1967). On q models some references are
Brainard and Tobin (1968), Tobin (1969), and subsequent developments in Hayashi (1982),
Summers (1981), and Abel and Blanchard (1986).
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Finance and Investment
The severity of the Great Depres-
sion, as argued by Fisher (1933), was
partly attributed by the heavy burden
of debt (i.e. high leverage of borrow-
ers) and consequently, business down-
turn precipitated a wave of bankrupt-
cies, enhancing the downturn. Then,
the macroeconomics literature follow-
ing the General Theory (i.e. Keynes
1936) largely ignored potential links
between output behavior and the per-
formance of credit markets. He em-
phasized the indirect connection be-
tween financial markets and real activ-
ity resulting from Keynes’s liquidity
preference theory, shifting the empha-
sis to money as the financial variable
most relevant to aggregate economic
behavior.
Then, Gurley and Shaw (1955)
began to redirect attention toward the
overall interaction between financial
structure and real activity, emphasiz-
ing financial intermediation, and par-
ticularly the role of financial interme-
diaries in the credit supply process as
opposed to the money supply pro-
cess.2  Noting the differences in finan-
cial sophistication between developed
and underdeveloped countries, they
came to the conclusion that the role of
intermediaries in improving the effi-
ciency of intertemporal trade was an
important factor governing economic
activity. A corollary argument was
that restricting attention to the money
supply made it impossible to properly
characterize the link between real and
financial activity. Gurley and Shaw
argued that more relevant to macro-
economic behavior than the money
stock was the economy’s overall “fi-
nancial capacity,” that is, the measure
of borrower’s ability to absorb debt
without having to reduce either cur-
rent spending or future spending com-
mitments. The behavior of balance
sheets, as key determinants of finan-
cial capacity, assumed an important
role, and intermediaries were relevant
because they extended borrower’s fi-
nancial capacity.
The change in macroeconomic
views appeared in 1958, Modigliani
and Miller (later known as MM theo-
rem) derived the formal proposition
that real economic decisions were in-
dependent of financial structure in a
setting of perfect capital markets. As a
result, financial variables started dis-
appearing from empirical investment
equations in the frictionless markets.
Another factor that helped to take
attention away from financial factors
was the methodological revolution in
macroeconomics in the 1970’s, that
emphasized the development of mac-
roeconomic models explicitly from
individual optimization (e.g. Blanchard
and Fischer 1989, and Diamond 1965).
However, the modification of indi-
vidual optimization (i.e. the introduc-
tion of heterogeneity among agents
and money) become the motivation for
trade in the business cycle theory.
2 Several important papers that supported this idea are Kuh and Meyer (1963), Tobin and Dolde
(1963) Brainard and Tobin (1963), Minsky (1975) and Kindleberger (1978), and Tobin (1975).
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A renovated interest in studying
the financial aspects appears to explain
the business cycle theory. This interest
arises as a result of progress in the
economics of information and incen-
tives. Both provide with useful tech-
niques for formalizing financial mar-
kets frictions. The basic insight of the
new work is that inefficiencies in trade
could arise due to the existence of
asymmetric information between the
agents participating in the market, that
is, the existence of informational ad-
vantages for either of the agents in-
volved in the transaction. In addition,
this type of informational problems
could be solved, or at least minimized,
creating incentives with the use of
contracts or other types of institutional
devices such as screening or monitor-
ing.
The existence of asymmetric in-
formation has encouraged other re-
searchers (e.g. Hubbard 1990; and
Hubbard 1997) to advance the invest-
ment process in the presence of imper-
fect capital market. He explains that
interest by contemporary researchers
in links between “internal funds” and
investment decisions reflects two main
concerns, one “micro” and one
“macro.” The “micro” concern re-
lates to consequences of informational
imperfections in credit markets. Prob-
lems of asymmetric information be-
tween borrowers and lenders create a
gap between the cost of external and
internal financing that gives internal
finance an essential role in the invest-
ment decision of the firm. Moreover,
the level of internal net worth becomes
a critical determinant of the terms
under which firms can borrow, hold-
ing constant true investment opportu-
nities.
The “macro” concern is that cy-
clical movements in investment ap-
pear too large to be explained by
market indicators of expected future
profitability or the user cost of capital.
As Hubbard (1990) states, to the ex-
tent that a sufficient number of firms
must raise finance in markets lacking
perfect information, microeconomic
market failures can generate correla-
tions in aggregate data different from
those suggested by standard models of
investment or the consequences of mac-
roeconomic policies. In particular, in-
terest rates are de-emphasized as the
main determinant of borrowing and
investment, with movements in inter-
nal net worth of corporate borrowers
(i.e., cash flows) being relatively more
important. This has led to identify
financial factors in propagating rela-
tively small shocks.
The micro concern is extended
further by Romer (1996) especially on
the allocative effects of informational
problems in financial markets. As he
describes, when firms and investors
are equally well informed, financial
markets function efficiently, and in-
vestments are valued according to their
expected payoffs and riskiness. How-
ever, in practice, firms are much bet-
ter informed about their investment
projects than potential outside inves-
tors are. In addition, the existence of
intermediaries between the ultimate
investors and firms means that there is
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a two-level problem of asymmetric
information: between intermediaries
and firms, and between individuals
and intermediaries.3
The literature on the economics of
information and incentives distin-
guishes two general types of informa-
tional problems that generate frictions
in capital markets and can then be used
to explain why lenders may ration
credit rather than raise interest rates to
clear markets. These problems are:
first, adverse selection, following Gale
(1987) and Mas-Colell et al. (1995),
this problem arises when an informed
individual’s trading decisions depend
on her privately held information in a
manner that adversely affects unin-
formed market participants. In this
case, asymmetries of information ex-
ist between individuals at the time of
contracting. With imperfect informa-
tion about the quality or riskiness of
the borrowers’ investment projects,
adverse selection creates a gap be-
tween the cost of financing in an unin-
formed capital market (which incorpo-
rates a “lemon” premium, see Akerlof
1970), and internally generated funds.
Second, the principal-agent prob-
lem (refer to Grossman and Hart 1983,
and Hart and Holstrom 1987), in this
case, asymmetries of information de-
velop subsequent to the signing of a
contract. Two types of problems have
been distinguished in this setting: those
resulting from hidden actions, also
known as moral hazard, produced by
the inability of, for example, the owner
of a firm to observe how hard his
manager is working; and those result-
ing from hidden information, in which
the manager possesses superior infor-
mation about the firm’s opportunities.
In the credit market framework, it is
the second type of problem, hidden
information, the one that is considered
in the literature.4  Due to the presence
of incentive problems and costly moni-
toring of managerial actions, external
suppliers of funds to firms require a
higher return to compensate them from
these monitoring costs and the poten-
tial hidden information problems asso-
ciated with manager’s control over the
allocation of investment funds.
A problem of the models dis-
cussed thus far is that they are highly
sensitive to exogenous restrictions
3 The role of intermediaries in overcoming imperfections in markets which transfer funds
between savers and investors has been stressed by models of financial intermediation, that apply
first principles to explain the existence and structure of intermediaries, and to describe how these
institutions may interact with aggregate real activity. Some important references are Fama (1980
and 1985), Diamond (1984), Williamson (1986 and 1987a), Boyd and Prescott (1986), Moore
(1987), Morgan (1987), Gorton and Haubrich (1986), Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Bhattacharya
and Gale (1987), Bernanke and Gertler (1987).
4 As Mas-Colell et al. (1995) note, the literature’s use of the term moral hazard is not entirely
uniform. Some authors use it to refer to either of the hidden action or hidden information variants
of the principal agent problem (for example, Hart and Holstrom 1987). Here we will use it only
for the hidden actions case.
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made in the form of the relevant finan-
cial contracts, since they use a very
restrictive form of debt contract.5 This
raised the question of the robustness of
the credit-rationing result, encourag-
ing other researchers such as Townsend
(1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985), and
Williamson (1987),  that attempt to
explore the effects of financial market
inefficiencies without making a priori
assumptions about financial structure.
Under this approach, the real/finan-
cial interaction is a purely endogenous
outcome.
The endogenous interaction be-
tween financial structure and real ac-
tivity in a market with a general type of
lemons problem is further explored by
Bernanke and Gertler (1990). This
lemons-induced rise in borrowing costs
reduces the efficiency of the invest-
ment process and in severe cases may
induce an investment collapse. An
important implication is that informa-
tional distortions can, in theory, have
quantitatively significant effects on
investment behavior. In addition, the
conclusions extend beyond situations
where simple debt contracts are the
exclusive financial instruments.
Why incorporate credit market
imperfections into mainstream models
of macroeconomic fluctuations? Al-
though Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(BGG henceforth) (1997) state several
reasons, but in the context of standard
dynamic macroeconomic models, they
show that credit market frictions may
significantly amplify both real and
nominal shocks to the economy. This
financial accelerator effect is a step
toward resolving the “small shocks,
large cycles” puzzle traditional in busi-
ness cycle analysis: large fluctuations
in aggregate economic activity arise
from what appear to be relatively small
impulses (such as modest changes in
real interest rates induced by monetary
policy).6 Moreover, credit market fric-
tions help to explain a broader class of
cyclical phenomena, such as changes
in credit extension and the spreads
between safe and risky interest rates.
BGG and other studies (for ex-
ample, Calomiris and Hubbard 1990;
Gertler 1992; Kiyotaki and Moore
1995; Fischer 1996; and Carlstrom
and Fuerst 1997) share the idea that, in
the analysis of macroeconomic dy-
namics, balance sheet indicators should
be thought of as state variables. That
is, financial conditions matter for cy-
clical behavior.
Testable Models
By adopting the Fazzari et al.
(1988) (FHP henceforth), we try to
test whether determinants of invest-
ment differ between firms for which, a
5 By using the Stiglitz-Weiss’s (1981) framework, the non-optimality of credit rationing (there
is too little investment at the credit-rationed equilibrium).
6 The financial accelerator effect refers to the declines in output arising from external sources
act to reduce firms’ net worth; these reductions in net worth reduce investment, reinforcing the
output decline.
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priori, the costs of internal financing
and external financing are similar, and
firms for which the cost of external
financing exceeds the cost of internal
financing. In particular, to identify a
group of firms that are most likely to
face binding constraints, FHP extend a
model from the public economics lit-
erature, in which dividends are a re-
sidual in firm decisions.7 The idea is
that, supposing a higher cost of adjust-
ing the capital stock relative to adjust-
ing dividend payouts, and that the cost
of external finance exceeds that of
internal finance, the investment of firms
with good investment opportunities
that retain all or nearly all of their
earnings will be more likely to be
sensitive to cash flow than that for
high-payout firms with a large (divi-
dend) cushion of funds to finance in-
vestment. So the FHP framework can
be interpreted as using cash flow to
measure the change in net worth. Al-
though firm cash flow is an imperfect
proxy for the change in net worth,
most studies (e.g. Bernanke and Gertler
1989; Calomiris and Hubbard 1990;
and Bernanke and Gilchrist 1997) use
it because it is virtually the only such
measure available for many firms.
Using cash flow, FHP estimates the
following model:
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where i and t denote the firm and time
period, I is investment, K is capital
stock, CF is cash flow, and average Q,
constructed from financial market data,
is used as a proxy for marginal q,8
substituting expected average returns
to capital (ROE) each period for mar-
ginal returns. In this specification v
i
denotes firm specific effects. Since the
estimation for equation (1) uses the
panel data and relate to individual
firm, so there is subject to be heteroge-
neity in these firms over time. In order
to take such heterogeneity explicitly
into account in our estimation proce-
dure, several assumptions about the
firm specific effects term have to be
made. Therefore, in our estimation,
four different effects are assumed, i.e.
common, fixed, random and time ef-
fects.
In Equation (1), we hypothesize
that the decline in the cost of financing
causes the decline in the expenses of
the firms. Consequently, this affects
the cash flow of the firms and persis-
tently the value of collateral (net worth)
and the position of firm’s balance
sheet. Therefore, cash flow could im-
7 This idea comes from the tax capitalization model of the dividend decision in the public
economics literature. In that model, internal funds are cheaper to the firm than external funds
because dividends are more highly taxed than capital gains.
8 According to Hayashi (1982), average and marginal q are equal for the model with an
assumption to have constant returns in the adjustment costs. The constant returns in the costs of
adjustment imply that q determines the growth rate of a firm’s capital stock.
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prove the firm’s current financial po-
sition and increase internally the funds
available for investment, investments
should respond positively to increases
in cash flow.
In the absence of capital market
frictions, the estimated coefficient c
should be zero as long as Q controls
adequately for investment opportuni-
ties; a significantly positive value of c
corresponds to a rejection of the fric-
tionless model and a suggestion of the
presence of financing constraints.
We also group firms into three
fixed categories: low, medium, and
high dividend payout. The result is
expected to find significantly larger
estimated cash flow coefficients, c, for
the low-dividend-payout firms than
for the high-dividend-payout firms. It
is this cross-sectional difference that
may lead us to conclude that financing
constraints are likely to be important
in many firms’ investment decisions.
This finding has been corroborated in
studies of firms for Japan (Hoshi et al.
1991), the United Kingdom (Devereux
and Schiantarelli 1990), Italy
(Schiantarelli and Sembenelli 1996),
Canada (Schaller 1993), and Germany
(Elston 1993). Also, using panel data
on U.S. manufacturing firms, Hubbard
et al. (1995) find similar results to
those of FHP using a pre-sample divi-
dend classification.
Empirical Results
Firm level data are collected from
the CD Rom database of Kuala Lumpur
Stock Exchange (KLSE), a database
containing the annual reports of all
Malaysia stock quoted firms. In order
to capture different investment behav-
ior among firms, we select the firms
that are listed under the sharia board (a
combination of first and second
boards). The firms are all distributed
over all sectors of the economy and the
data run from 1995 to 2000. We ex-
clude financial-related firms. To avoid
dominating outliers, we delete firm for
which any variable is in the upper or
lower 0.1 percent of the data set. This
leaves us with an unbalanced panel
data of 361 firms (1742 observations).
We divided the firm into three differ-
ent categories; low-dividend (firms
with dividend average less than 4.80%),
middle-dividend (firms with dividend
average 4.81%-9.60%), and high-divi-
dend (firms with dividend average
more than 9.60%). To see whether
firms in the panel are credit con-
strained, we consider bankruptcies that
occur during the sample period. We
find that there is no firms go bankrupt
during the study period.  In addition,
the accounting standard for these firms
are similar for both firms (i.e, first and
second boards, and sharia board) ex-
cept the Islamic banking system.
The analysis in this section re-
ports the descriptive analysis and the
regression results by using the panel
data estimation. Table 1 shows the
descriptive analysis results for the low
dividend firms, middle dividend firms
and high dividend firms. Generally,
the  investment values show that the
investment for the high dividend firms
is larger rather than the low and middle
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Table 1. Descriptive Analysis
Investment Capital Stock Marginal Q Cash Flow
Low
Mean 209564.90 170952.70 1.87988 -4558.88
Median 99468.00 62965.00 1.04138 3505.00
Maximum 2703086.00 4574529.00 21.91999 722648.00
Minimum 204.00 28.00 0.00165 -808054.00
Std. Dev. 307772.70 416644.30 2.40795 80933.39
Middle
Mean 229273.80 415292.30 1.43613 26186.74
Median 125896.00 83864.00 0.91463 994.00
Maximum 4539010.00 42988300.00 17.98224 1636600.00
Minimum 8818.00 1408.00 0.00297 -361881.00
Std. Dev. 452910.40 3126057.00 1.71536 122070.40
High
Mean 471011.40 713256.90 1.38159 66364.81
Median 174804.00 124101.00 0.75211 11324.50
Maximum 21136700.00 45709600.00 16.48663 2528800.00
Minimum 3287.00 776.00 0.00396 -261000.00
Std. Dev. 1162296.00 2800678.00 1.75970 204009.80
Table 2. Regression Results
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(low-dividend) (middle-dividend) (high-dividend)
Q
it
-1.0042 -0.0550 0.1243
(206.3476)* (50.3038)* (178.1367)*
CF/K
it-1
0.6363 1.8313 1.3432
(18.2421)* (13.6606)* (86.6343)*
No. of observations 549 218 438
Adjusted R2 0.9020 0.9528 0.9921
F 9.00E+32 4.30E+32 5.90E+32
r 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
DW 0.8658 0.4708 1.5915
Note: * indicates statistical significance at 1 percent level.
The values in (parentheses) refer to t-statistic.
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dividend firms. The same trend is
reported for capital stock and cash
flow based on the mean and the median
values, respectively. While for Q, low
dividend firms report a higher mean,
median, and standard deviation values
compared to the middle and the high
dividend firms. Based on the mean
values, the results imply that the high
dividend firms tend to have higher
investment, capital stock, cash flow
and low Q.
This section analyzes the estima-
tion results. We run four different
models (common effects, fixed ef-
fects, random effects and time effects)
for each firm’s category. But after the
screening process that considered the
best adjusted R2 value, the r value
compared to the F-value for the GLS
model and the significant coefficient,
we conclude that the GLS method with
fixed effect model are the best for each
estimation for different firms. Table 1
reported the estimation results.
As reported in Table 2, the result
shows that the estimates for the cash
flow coefficients are of the right sign
and significant. But the increases of
investment are larger for the middle-
dividend firms rather than the high-
dividend and low-dividend firms. This
implies that the cash flow of the middle-
dividend firms is more sensitive to the
investment rather than the high and
low-dividend firms. According to FHP,
firms that retain all or nearly all of
their earnings in investment are more
likely to be sensitive to cash flow than
the high-payout firms with a large
(dividend) cushion of funds to finance
investment.
While for Q, the coefficient is
statistically significant and of the right
sign for the high-dividend firms. Ac-
cording to Tobin’s q theory, the firms
increase its capital stock if q is high.
An increase in capital stock increases
the investment. But the coefficients
are of the unexpected sign for the low
and middle-dividend firms. The result
shows that an increase in the firm’s
capital stock decreases the firm’s in-
vestments. According to Romer (1996),
a firm increases its capital stock if the
market value of capital exceeds the
costs to acquire the capital. Maybe in
this situation, even though the firm’s
capital stocks are high, but the costs to
acquire the capital are greater. There-
fore, an increase in firm’s capital stock
decreases the firm’s investments.
Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is two-
fold: to show how credit market im-
perfections have been incorporated to
dynamic general equilibrium models
of the economy, using recent advances
in the economics of information and
incentives; and to provide an empirical
evidence for investment equation. The
following conclusions can be extracted
from the study realized in this paper:
first, theoretically, agency costs aris-
ing from asymmetric information raise
the cost of external finance, and there-
fore discourage investment. This re-
sult suggests that the efficiency of the
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financial system in processing infor-
mation and monitoring borrowers is a
potentially important determinant of
investment. This observation has im-
plications for both short-run fluctua-
tions and long-run growth.
Second,   the empirical studies of
firm investment provide strong sup-
port for the basic predictions of links
between changes in net worth and
investment arising from informational
problems in financial markets. For
many firms in the economy, the evi-
dence is consistent with: a gap be-
tween the cost of external and internal
financing; and a positive relationship
between the borrower’s spending and
net worth. Therefore, we should ex-
amine not only with respect to invest-
ment in plant and equipment spending,
but also in inventory investment, re-
search and development, employment,
business formation and survival, pric-
ing, and corporate risk management.
Third, credit market imperfec-
tions create two new channels through
which monetary policy can affect the
investment decisions of the agents in
the economy: the balance sheet and
the bank lending channels.
Fourth, while there is relatively
an agreement on the role of financial
frictions in the investment decisions of
some firms, there is less agreement on
the magnitude of that role. Several
possible extensions of this line of re-
search: analyze the link between inter-
nal resources and the shadow cost of
external financing in models of deci-
sions in individual firms and indus-
tries; and estimate the quantitative im-
portance of the financial accelerator
for aggregate investment fluctuations.
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